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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between national varieties of capitalism and firm engagement with the norms and best
practices promoted within the global organisational field for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a content analysis of the
CSR reports of US and European firms, we show that firms from the coordinated market economies (CME) of Europe engage more
substantively with labour and human rights than their US counterparts that operate in a liberal market economy (LME). The
environmental commitments of firms in both regions, however, are more developed than practices related to these social issues.
These findings support the view that CSR is more developed in CMEs than LMEs, but limit this support to social CSR issues. We
posit that firms’ higher levels of engagement with environmental CSR likely reflect the extent to which environmental norms have
become embedded in global markets rather than how CSR is promoted by national capitalist systems.
# 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Policy and Society Associates (APSS). This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, various private and public actors including the UN, the multi-stakeholder Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) and the NGO-led Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have developed international codes of conduct in
an effort to encourage firms voluntarily to improve and make transparent their environmental and social impacts.
Although these codes seek to address a variety of social and environmental problems from child labour to
deforestation, increasingly the authors of these schemes have drawn on a common set of norms and best practices such
as ‘stakeholder engagement’, ‘transparency’ and ‘continuous improvement auditing’ to bring about change in
corporate practice. As such, firms have had to react to what sociologists refer to as a broad organisational field for
sustainable and responsible behaviour. Research over the past decade has revealed that firms’ engagement with these
schemes and the practices contained in them varies considerably according to their size, sector and home country (see
Bernhagen & Kollman, 2013). These findings call into question the political and institutional conditions under which
large firms are likely to engage with the global norms and management practices promoted within the organisational
field for corporate social responsibility (CSR).
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In this article we focus on the ways in which national styles of capitalism shape firms’ engagement with these new CSR
norms and practices. This question has gained prominence recently because of the well-known effect that home country
has on firms’ CSR behaviour and because scholars have developed competing explanations of how different varieties of
capitalism contribute to this variation. The debate draws on the insight that a firm’s behaviour is shaped by state-society
relations and the nature of public authority in its home country. This implies that CSR practices will differ in so-called
liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). The former, which characterises the nature
of capitalist relations in Anglo-American countries, relies heavily on the market to regulate key economic relationships
such as those between capital and labour. In these systems, economic actors receive only limited support from the state in
governing their relationships and public goods provision. By contrast, in the coordinated market economies found in
north-western, continental Europe, economic relations largely are managed outside of competitive markets through
consensual bargaining between capital, labour, key societal actors and the state.
Although many CSR scholars agree that these different institutional arrangements likely explain some of the cross-
national differences in CSR practices, they disagree about how and why. Some scholars argue that CSR institutions and
practices will be more developed in LMEs where they serve as a ‘substitute’ for more extensive public regulation and
offer firms a source of legitimacy in countries where the state only minimally compensates those not well served by the
market (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Kinderman, 2012). Other scholars posit that firms in CMEs will engage more
substantively with CSR because they are embedded in social networks and interact with the stakeholders who promote
voluntary environmental and social standards to a greater extent than firms in LMEs (Van Tulder, Van Wijk, & Kolk,
2009).
We join these debates by employing a content analysis of the CSR reports of 40 transnational corporations (TNCs)
from the US and the coordinated market economies of Western Europe to examine how firms headquartered in two
different varieties of capitalism engage with global CSR norms and practices. We take a somewhat different approach
to addressing this question than is typical in the literature. First, unlike many studies of CSR and private governance,
we do not focus on the effects of individual codes such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC). Rather we examine the
extent to which firms from two different types of capitalism engage with the broader set of corporate social
responsibility norms and best practices that underpin many prominent global codes and reporting standards (Tschopp
& Nastanski, 2014). The code-based approach has yielded important lessons about how private governance schemes
operate and what types of firms are likely to participate in them. But we know far less about what public goods firms
are willing to provide or which specific accountability practices they are willing to employ.
Second, we use the concept of engagement to measure firm behaviour rather than CSR code participation or
performance as is common in the private governance literature. In addition to offering a more robust indicator of CSR
participation, our engagement measure also complements CSR performance studies. The performance measures
typically used in the literature such as air emissions or labour violations are important, but tend to be quite narrow and
difficult to generalise from broadly. We develop a coding frame that enables us to assess firm engagement across
different types of environmental and social issues without conflating them or generalising behaviour from one narrow
performance indicator. Further, we analyse the statements by CEOs and senior managers published in these reports to
uncover the rationale that these mangers give for undertaking CSR activities. This analysis allows us to gauge which
audiences and social actors firms engage with and how important they view the influence of these actors on their CSR
practices. The latter is crucial for understanding the effects that different varieties of capitalism have on firms’ CSR
practices, but is not always well captured by either participation or performance studies.
Our findings partially challenge both major arguments about how varieties of capitalism shape firms’ engagement
with CSR. First, we find that firms from the coordinated market economies of continental Europe engage more
substantively with social CSR issues, such as employee welfare and human rights, than their liberal market
counterparts from the US. Further, European firms cite social pressure as a key rationale for CSR engagement and
highlight their interaction with external actors more often than US firms. These findings largely support the
expectation that firms’ CSR practices will be more developed in CME countries because of the emphasis that firms in
these countries place on their relations with non-market actors. Our analysis of firms’ engagement with environmental
CSR, however, tells a different story. Here the variation in levels of engagement between US and European firms is far
less pronounced. More importantly, firms in both regions engage more substantively with environmental than social
issues. This suggests that the ability of societal actors and the state to persuade firms in CMEs to make greater labour
and human rights commitments is real, but limited and contingent on CSR area. It also raises the question of why both
European and US firms engage more substantively with environmental issues than other CSR areas promoted by the
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organisational field, something that varieties of capitalism accounts cannot explain. Our findings suggest that firms’
higher levels of engagement with environmental CSR has more to do with the ways in which environmental norms
have become embedded in global markets than with how CSR has been promoted by national capitalist systems of any
variety.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we locate firms’ reporting behaviour within the global CSR
organisational field, review the literature on the relationship between varieties of capitalism and private CSR
governance, and describe how our empirical analysis adds to this work. In the Section 3 we outline the content analysis
methods we use to investigate firms’ CSR engagement. Section 4 presents the results before we offer analysis of the
findings and consider their implications for future research on private governance in the Section 5.
2. The global CSR organisational field and varieties of capitalism
2.1. Corporate social responsibility and the global organisational field for sustainability
Although now often associated with the private codes of conduct that promote environmental and social
sustainability,  corporate social responsibility  continues to be a broad and contested concept. It has remained a
moving target that changes over time and according to who is using it. The term itself first gained prominence in the
US in the 1970s with the rise of consumer protection movements (Soule, 2009). Corporations also sought to shape
the CSR concept during this era by linking it to the community and philanthropic work in which many large
corporations, particularly in the US and the UK, engage (Matten & Moon, 2008). The late 1990s saw a resurgence
of CSR activism; this time centred on the problems associated with economic globalisation and the perceived
difficulties of regulating increasingly powerful corporations that operate across multiple jurisdictions with different
regulatory regimes.
To address these problems, transnationally-linked NGOs as well as established intergovernmental organisations
(IOs) such as the UN and OECD have created numerous voluntary codes that encourage firms to improve their
environmental, labour and human rights practices. These actors increasingly have sought to target firms directly
through such codes rather than relying solely on government regulation or binding international treaties to change
corporate behaviour (Pattberg, 2005; Soule, 2009). These tactics reflect many NGOs’ perceptions that it has become
increasingly difficult to lobby governments to pass new regulation or to get states to coordinate such regulatory efforts
through international agreements (Vogel, 2006; Kinderman, this issue). Although voluntary in nature, the CSR codes
that NGOs and IOs have developed seek to regulate corporate behaviour and many, especially those sponsored by
NGOs, have become sophisticated in design. The FSC’s sustainable forestry label, for example, requires that an
independent, third-party auditor verify a firm’s compliance with the code before it can be certified as a participant.
Although the number of voluntary CSR codes has proliferated since the 1990s, these schemes increasingly are
structured by common norms, notions of best practice and reporting standards (Tschopp & Nastanski, 2014). Several
observers have argued that this convergence has been facilitated by the development of an organisational field of CSR
standards bodies (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009). An organisational field is defined as ‘‘the organisations, that in
aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life’’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). Such fields are held
together by interactive networks that bring its constituent members into frequent contact. Once established, they tend
to lead to organisational isomorphism, or greater similarity, as increased interaction between organisations often
produces common ideas of legitimacy (mimetic isomorphism) and professional norms (normative isomorphism)
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 150–156).
The CSR organisational field draws on the overarching sustainable development norm that encourages corporations
to define success in relation to their ‘triple bottom line’. According to this logic, firms should pay equal attention to
their environmental, social and economic performance (Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014). The CSR standards bodies that
have come into existence since the 1990s have sought to create practices that firms can follow to realise this vaguely
defined goal across different environmental and social issues (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009). In keeping with their
insider strategy, these organisations have developed structures and practices designed, at least in part, to gain the trust
of participant market actors. Specifically, the standards bodies in the field are dedicated to promoting: collaborative
rulemaking through multi-stakeholder structures, transparency in rulemaking and implementation, and corporate
learning through procedures such as target-setting, auditing, third-party certification and reporting (Loconto &
Fouilleux, 2014). Thus, the practices endorsed by the organisational field focus more on common procedures than on
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common performance outcomes, although some standards organisations, such as the FSC, marry these procedures
with substantive performance requirements (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009).
These notions of best practice now structure many of the prominent CSR codes that seek to improve firms’
environmental, labour and/or human rights practices including the Fairtrade logo, the Forest Stewardship Council’s
sustainable forestry certificate and the Global Reporting Initiative (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009). Even the UN’s
Global Compact, which is not a standards body per se, has adopted many of these practices by creating a multi-
stakeholder body to oversee the programme and by encouraging participants to use the GRI framework to increase the
credibility of firms’ improvement programmes (UN Global Compact, 2015). Thus, the organisational field has sought
to define CSR in terms of broad sustainability goals and a more specific set of best practices. This definition is still
evolving and indeed is still contested. Older CSR activities such as community work and philanthropy, for example,
remain important to many companies’ CSR activities, but have not been fully incorporated in the organisational field.
2.2. Explaining firms’ (uneven) engagement with the CSR organisational field
Almost two decades of research on private CSR governance has illustrated that the codes promoted by the
organisational field have influenced firms’ CSR behaviour, but this influence has been limited and uneven (see
Bernhagen & Kollman, 2013). More than 8000 firms have joined up to the UN Global Compact, but participation is
heavily skewed towards large firms that are located in Europe and to a lesser extent in the US and Japan (UN Global
Compact, 2015). Numerous studies have shown that larger firms are far more likely to participate in these schemes
than their small or medium-sized counterparts (Bennie, Bernhagen, & Mitchell, 2007; Prakash & Potoski, 2006).
Corporations’ involvement in CSR codes also is shaped heavily by the nature of their sector activity, with firms in
extractive sectors, for example, frequently seeking the reputational gains that CSR participation can bring (Bennie
et al., 2007; Dashwood, 2012).
Scholars similarly have sought to explain why firm participation in CSR schemes consistently varies by home
country (Kollman & Prakash, 2001; Prakash & Potoski, 2006). Here the findings are less clear, but a number of factors
appear relevant. Firms headquartered in democratic countries are more likely to participate than firms from non-
democratic ones (Bernhagen, Mitchell, & Thissen-Smits, 2013; Perkins & Neumayer, 2010). The extent to which a
firm’s home country is integrated in international markets and/or NGO networks also have proven to be a good
predictor of firm participation in many global codes (Berliner & Prakash, 2012; Perkins & Neumayer, 2010). Other
scholars have examined how levels of regulation in a firm’s home country affect CSR activity (see Tosun et al., this
issue). Prakash and Potoski (2013), for example, find that corporations operating in countries with more stringent
environmental legislation are more likely to join ISO 14001, a certifiable management system.
More recently, scholars have drawn on the well-established varieties of capitalism literature to explain how home
country affects firms’ CSR behaviour. Much of this work utilises Peter Hall and David Soskice’s framework that
compares liberal market with coordinated market economies (2001). These two forms of capitalism are distinguished
from one another by the degree to which they depend on market or non-market forms of coordination. In liberal market
economies, like the UK and US, ‘firms coordinate their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market
arrangements’, while in coordinated market economies, such as Germany, ‘firms depend more heavily on non-market
relationships to coordinate their relationships with other actors’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 8). Although many scholars
posit that these varieties of capitalism can, at least partially, explain cross-national differences in CSR engagement,
they disagree about how and why. Daniel Kinderman has demonstrated that British firms and the business community
in the UK, an LME, have used CSR as a complement to the market liberalisation that has occurred since the Thatcher
era. In his account, business actors in LMEs strategically employ CSR as a substitute for government regulation, which
explains why the UK has been a first-mover on CSR (Kinderman, 2012). Using firm-level data, Jackson and
Apostolakou (2010) similarly show that firms from LMEs score better on almost all measures of CSR performance—
both social and environmental—than their counterparts from CMEs. They, like Kinderman, attribute this superior
performance to a CSR strategy that firms in LMEs employ to justify light-touch regulation by the state.
These studies have been countered by scholars who conceive of CSR as a mirror of stakeholder relations in different
countries. In these accounts firms from CMEs are posited, and often found, to have better quality CSR practices as a
result of the consensual relations firms have with the societal stakeholders who promote environmental and social
standards. In a recent study, Lim and Tsutsui (2012) analyse the CSR reporting behaviour of firms that participate in
the UN Global Compact. They find that firms from countries with liberal economic policy regimes are more likely than
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their counterparts from other countries to make what they call ‘ceremonial commitments’ to the UNGC. Similarly, in a
study based on a content analysis of corporate occupational health and safety codes, Van Tulder et al. (2009) find that
European firms headquartered in CMEs have more substantive CSR commitments and measures than firms in the US
or Japan. They argue that these European firms are more ‘culturally’ attuned to integrating the concerns of societal
stakeholders into their business strategies (Van Tulder et al., 2009: 405–410).
These contradictory findings partially stem from the different methods, concepts and measures of CSR utilised in
the studies. Kinderman, for example, is interested in how CSR organisations and business associations promote
voluntary practices in different countries. The other studies concentrate on firm-level CSR performance, but often use
different indicators that measure very different areas of CSR practice. Lim and Tsutsui, as well as Van Tulder, Van
Wijk and Kolk, measure performance in relation to specific CSR codes. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), by contrast,
use measures compiled by a business analyst firm. As a result, these studies utilise different definitions of CSR with
some focusing simply on labour issues and others covering social, environmental and community activities.
We seek to address these conceptual and measurement problems by taking a different approach. First, rather than
studying firms’ adherence to the prescriptions of a specific code or their performance according to rating agencies, we
examine how firms engage with the environmental and social issues, best practices and norms promoted by the global
CSR organisational field. Assessing how firms engage with these global norms and best practices allows us to gauge
firms’ CSR behaviour across different issue areas—environment, labour and human rights—while keeping each
distinct. Studies that focus on specific codes or use established CSR indices generally either focus on a single CSR area
or conflate different areas within single measures. The index used by Jackson and Apostolakou, for example, includes
both philanthropy and labour issues in their definition of social CSR, despite the clear differences between these areas
outlined above.
Second, we measure firm behaviour in terms of engagement with these established CSR norms and best practices
rather than by performance per se as much of the literature claims to do. In this way, we avoid the concept stretching
that occurs when practices such as adopting a CSR policy or publishing a report are equated with outcome
performance. We also avoid the problem of inferring broader CSR performance from narrow measures such as air
emissions or violations of specific labour standards. Our strategy allows us to compare firms’ CSR behaviour both
across countries and across different CSR areas. The latter is important because there are reasons to suspect that firms
from LMEs and CMEs engage differently across these areas. The consensual, tripartite stakeholder relations between
business, labour and the state fostered in CMEs, for example, should influence labour-related CSR practices, but it is
less clear if this would spill over into environmental CSR. Finally, we also examine the rationale that senior managers
in the reports give for their firm’s CSR engagement. This gives us insight into the extent to which stakeholder relations
really drive CSR practices as posited by both sets of varieties of capitalism arguments.
3. Data and methods
We analyse the CSR reports published by firms from the US and continental Europe to evaluate how firms from two
different varieties of capitalism engage with the common sustainability norms and notions of best practice embedded
in the CSR organisational field. The data are derived from a content analysis of CSR reports published by 40 firms,
20 headquartered in the US and 20 headquartered in three West European countries classified as coordinated market
economies in the literature: Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). All the reports were
published in either 2011 or 2012. The firms in the analysis are among the largest 50 in their region (Western Europe) or
country (US) as listed in the Fortune Global 500 index (for a list of the firms see Appendix A). We analysed the most
recent stand-alone CSR report for each firm that was available from the CorporateRegister database or from the firm’s
own website (CorporateRegister, 2013).
We chose to analyse the CSR reports of large TNCs because they are the most likely to publish such reports. This also
allows us to hold firm size broadly constant. To this end, we have included firms from three West European countries for
comparison with the US, as reliance on a single European country would inevitably result in a sample that is not well-
matched on size. The two sub-samples are also broadly similar with regard to industrial sector. Both contain roughly equal
numbers of firms from four sectors: manufacturing, transport, finance and retail. Finally, the two samples are also
comparable in terms of presence in different geographical markets (measured by primary sales location), with 60% of
companies in each group serving primarily their home-regional markets. By holding these firm-level factors roughly
constant, we can better evaluate the effects that different varieties of capitalism have on corporate CSR behaviour.
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We analysed three common sections of each report using a self-generated coding frame based on the areas and best
practices promoted by the CSR organisational field. The three sections we scrutinised are: the CEO/management
statement(s), the environmental section and the social section. The latter examines a firm’s commitments to labour/
employee issues and human rights. These two areas represent the issues that the CSR organisational field has promoted
most aggressively, unlike CSR issues such as corporate philanthropy. We included the management letter in the
analysis to assess the rationale that firms give for their CSR engagement and the extent to which this rationale is shaped
by stakeholder relations as the varieties of capitalism literature posits. We identified the environment and social
sections of each report by taking the naturally occurring sections so labelled by the firm itself and adding further
occurrences to it using a dictionary search. All 40 firms included a management letter in their report. Similarly, a large
majority had naturally occurring environmental and social sections, although some have separate sections for
employee issues and human rights. The three sections included in our analysis on average represent approximately
50% of a firm’s report. The other common sections that firms include are their economic performance/activities,
company information and community programmes.
In the management statement we coded the following: rationale for engaging in CSR activity, reference to global
CSR norms, reference to CSR codes/standards, and reference to stakeholders. We initially derived our codes for CSR
rationale from the business literature and subsequently added codes that emerged from the analysis (Hartman, Rubin,
& Dhanda, 2007). We coded for the following areas in the environmental and social sections: management practices
promoted by the CSR field, issues for which the firm provides impact measures and issues for which the firm reports
improvement goals. Finally, we assess the quality of the data that firms disclose about their impacts and improvement
targets using simple indices that measure whether the firm includes quantitative data, a qualitative description and
trend data for each issue area included in the social and environmental coding. The two indices—one for impact
measures and one for improvement targets—are additive and weigh each quality criteria equally.
There are limitations to our approach. Although we maintain that the strength of our analysis lies in the in-depth
examination of firm documents and what these reveal about firms’ CSR practices, the reliability of the information
contained in these documents is open to question. The reports are strategic documents used for the purpose of
enhancing public relations. Although no doubt highly ‘spun’, we believe there is much to be learned from these
documents about how firms engage with CSR and their rationale for doing so. At the very least, the rhetoric contained
in the reports reflects what firms’ think society and their key stakeholders want to hear. Further, as public documents
signed by CEOs, and often scrutinised by NGOs, firms must realise that there is a significant possibility that they can
be held to account for any obvious gulfs between their stated commitments and actual behaviour. The fact that we and
others in the literature who analyse CSR reports find noticeable patterns of rhetoric and reported behaviour across
time, sector and country strongly suggests that these reports represent, if imperfectly, some version of how CSR is
actually conceptualised and practiced within firms (Goessling & Vocht, 2007).
Finally, we acknowledge that we are examining only one facet of corporate social responsibility as defined by the
firms themselves. Most TNCs include additional areas of CSR engagement in their reports, most obviously their
community and corporate giving programmes. As we have emphasised above, these community programmes are
distinct from the sustainability codes that have emerged within the organisational field since the 1990s and do not
represent the type of regulation conceived of as private governance in the literature. Therefore, we have excluded these
areas from the analysis.
4. Firm engagement with the global CSR organisational field in the US and Europe
4.1. CSR engagement in the US and Europe
The results indicate that firms from the US and Europe have been influenced by common notions of best practice.
All 40 firms in our analysis publish a stand-alone CSR report indicating that they have committed, at least minimally,
to being transparent about their social and environmental impacts and stated obligations. Further, the CSR reports from
both regions contain numerous references to key norms of the CSR field such as sustainable development and
stakeholder engagement. Many of the firms in the sample also participate in prominent global CSR codes such as the
UN Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative. These codes are both influential within the CSR
organisational field and reflective of its core norms and best practices. Among our 40 firms, 80% have signed up to the
GRI Guidelines and 58% are members of the UNGC, indicating at least ceremonial commitment to these codes and the
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practices contained in them (GRI, 2013; UN Global Compact, 2015). As the content analysis reveals, most firms from
both regions flesh out these more general commitments by reporting that they implement a common set of
management practices, including having a management system, auditing internal CSR performance, carrying out
employee training and monitoring the social and environmental impacts of their supply chain; although both European
and US firms are more likely to apply these management practices to their environmental than to their social activities
(Fig. 1).
A high percentage of US and European firms further disclose information about their environmental impact and
improvement goals in specific areas such as climate change, energy, resource use, pollution, product impact and
compliance with environmental regulation. Ninety-five percent of firms from both regions, for example, disclose
information about their greenhouse gas emissions (Fig. 2). More than half of the reports from both regions also contain
information about their firm’s impacts in the other five environmental areas included in the coding. Although firms in
the two regions are less forthcoming when reporting on their specific targets for improvement, a majority have
identifiable goals for each of the six environmental areas listed above with the exception of compliance and pollution
reduction (Fig. 3).
The levels of environmental reporting are thus high among both the European and US firms. The European firms,
however, tend to offer somewhat better quality information in the environmental sections of their reports as measured
by the index we created based on the type and breadth of data firms disclose about their impact in the six areas
examined. The average quality score of the impact data in environmental sections of the European reports was 80 out
of a total of 100 points in the index. US firms, by contrast, only score 65 out of 100 points. Similarly, the quality of the
improvement goals is also higher in the European reports. Here the latter scored 58 of 100 points, while the US reports
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Fig. 2. Environmental impact areas (percent reporting by country).
Fig. 1. CSR management practices (percent reporting by country).
only received 44 of 100 points.1 Despite these differences in data quality, overall the levels of environmental disclosure
by firms in both regions are relatively high, which can be interpreted as a part of a wider environmental strategy,
entailing long-term commitments and objectives.
Firms’ reporting of their social impacts, i.e. employee issues and broader human rights, is both less precise and
more influenced by home country than is the case with their environmental reporting. Few US firms flesh out their
general commitment to being a good employer with a discussion of specific areas of impact (Fig. 4) or improvement
(Fig. 5).
Although most US firms discuss the diversity of their workforce (90%) and claim to maintain rigorous health and
safety standards (75%), only 25% mention their performance in the area of collective bargaining, and fewer than 10%
mention their practices on maintaining a living wage for their employees or combating forced labour. Not one US firm
reports its impact on child labour. Similarly, US firms publish very little detail about goals for improving their
performance in these labour areas. Outside of these core labour areas, US firms disclose even less information about
their impacts on non-employee human rights such as those related to indigenous groups or the use of security
companies, despite the recent promotion of these issues by the UN and NGOs. Only 12% of US firms publish
information on these human rights issues.
European firms flesh out their commitment to labour rights to a greater extent than US firms, but like their US
counterparts offer less detail than in their environmental sections. In addition to reporting on the diversity and the
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Fig. 4. Social impact areas (percent reporting by country).
Fig. 3. Environmental improvement targets (percent reporting by country).
1 Non-parametric Mann–Whitney tests confirms that there is no statistically significant difference across the two samples with reference to impact
measures quality (U = 114.5, P > 0.01 two sided) and improvement targets quality (U = 128.5, P > 0.01 two sided).
health and safety of their workers, the majority of European firms publish data on collective bargaining. A high
percentage also reports their impact on child (55%) and forced labour (45%) as well as their procedures for providing a
living wage for their employees (25%). In addition, European firms are better at reporting on their non-employee
human rights impacts. Twenty-two percent disclose information about these impacts, most by declaring compliance
with the UN International Bill of Human Rights. Further, European firms offer more detailed accounts of their
improvement plans in these areas. This again is in contrast to US firms, who offer almost no information about their
goals for improving labour standards outside of health and safety (Fig. 5).
Finally, the quality of the impact measures and improvement targets for firms’ social performance is again higher in
the European reports than in those published by US firms. Using the same quality index as for the environmental
sections, the European firms score an average of 56 points out of a total of 100 for the quality of their social impact
measures, which is considerably higher than the US firms’ average score of 36 out of 100.2 The difference in the
quality of their improvement targets is similarly pronounced, with European firms scoring 34 out of 100 points and US
firms only 12 of 100 points. It is notable however, that the quality of the social data reported by firms in both regions is
significantly lower than the quality of the environmental data that they disclose.
4.2. Rationales for CSR engagement in US and European firms
All 40 firms in the analysis publish statements by the CEO and/or other top managers that summarise how these
senior managers define their firms’ social and environmental commitments as well as the key principles and rationales
that underpin these commitments. As illustrated in Table 1, more than half the firms from each region (55% of
European and 95% of US) indicate that their CSR engagement is motivated by pressure from market actors or a desire
to be more competitive in the marketplace. In Europe the weaker market motivation is supplemented by a desire to
increase firms’ social legitimacy as 65% indicate that their CSR activity is influenced by social pressure. By contrast,
only 10% of US firms mention social pressure. Senior managers of firms in both regions also frequently state that their
firm’s CSR commitments are motivated by an internal ethical commitment to a particular CSR area. A high percentage
of both European and US firms, 80% and 60% respectively, claim to have an ethical commitment to environmental
stewardship. Fifty percent of European and 45% of US firms also maintain that they have an ethical commitment to
enhancing employee welfare. European CEOs, however, are much more likely to state they have an ethical
commitment to broader human rights (25%) than their US counterparts (5%). The management statements thus
indicate that firms’ rationales for CSR engagement have distinct regional characteristics, although commonalties exist.
CSR activities in both regions are motivated by a mixture of instrumental and ethical factors. The market appears to be
a stronger rationale in the US, while social pressure seems to be more important for European firms.
These differences in CSR rationales are in keeping with the stakeholders that US and European firms highlight in
their management statements. While more than half the firms in both regions highlight market actors such as
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Fig. 5. Social improvement targets (percent reporting by country).
2 The Mann–Whitney tests for the quality of the impact data (U = 83.5, P < 0.01, two sided) and for the quality of the improvement programme
(U = 95.5, P < 0.01, two sided) confirm this different is statistically significant.
customers, business partners, employees and shareholders as important stakeholders, European firms are more likely
than their US counterparts to mention the non-market actors associated with concerns about ‘social legitimacy’
(Table 1). Thirty-five percent of European firms mention NGOs in their management statement; only 15% of US firms
do so. Sixty percent of these European firms highlight government regulators as important stakeholders; in the US
sample only 25% mention regulators. The most striking difference, however, is how many European and how few US
firms mention intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, many of which sponsor prominent CSR codes and
norms. Seventy percent of the European firms cite IOs as an important stakeholder, while only 10% of US firms do so.
Similarly, while less than half of the US firms indicate that their CSR activities are influenced by a global CSR code
such as the UN’s Global Compact, 65% of European firms mention the UN code (Table 1). In general, with the
exception of their traditional emphasis on the communities in which they operate, US firms appear to be less
influenced by, and less enamoured of, non-market actors, particularly non-market political actors that come from
outside of the US.
Overall, our analysis of the management statements shows that European and US firms describe their reasons for
engaging in CSR activity in distinct ways. In the US, firms emphasise market factors to a greater degree than in
Europe. Although US firms also highlight the contributions they make to the communities in which they exist,
community generally is not defined in terms of specific societal actors nor is the goal necessarily to increase dialogue
with these actors. This stands in contrast to European firms, which seek to engage with key stakeholders, especially
national and international regulators, and to link their market success and social responsibilities more closely to
stakeholder dialogue.
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Table 1
Theme coverage in management statements (percent reporting by country).
Theme Code Europe (%) USA (%)
Rationale Ethical-Community 10 80
Ethical-Corruption 15 0
Ethical-Environment 80 60
Ethical-Human Rights 25 5
Ethical-Labour Rights 50 45
Market 55 95
Risk Management 15 5
Social Pressure 65 10
Global CSR norms Continuous Improvement 10 0
Materiality 25 25
Stakeholder Dialogue 50 5
Sustainability 80 35
Transparency 35 30
CSR initiatives CSR Awards 15 10
Global Reporting Initiative 20 0
ISO 14001 0 0
OECD 0 0
Sector Specific 15 10
Stock Marker CSR indexes 15 0
UN Global Compact 65 10
UN Guiding Principles 20 5
Stakeholders mentioned Business Partners 50 50
Community 45 90
Customers 80 70
Employees 95 80
Intergovernmental Organizations 70 10
NGOs 35 15
Political Regulators 60 25
Shareholders 35 45
Suppliers 25 10
Trade Unions 5 0
The following two excerpts, the first from Daniel Akerson of GM and the second, a joint letter by senior managers at
Daimler, illustrate the differences in these rationales.
We recognize that sustainability feeds our bottom line and that sustaining a profitable business is our ultimate
responsibility. Profits enable reinvestment — in R&D to reimagine a car’s DNA; in cleaner, more fuel-efficient
technologies; in plants that better conserve resources; in improved vehicle safety; in job creation and stability;
and in contributions to the communities in which we live and work (Akerson, 2012).
Honorable business people. . .want to not only gain an advantage but also serve the needs of their customers,
business partners, employees, and society. . .Our stakeholders today rightly expect that our ‘‘culture of top
performance’’ should not only apply to our products and technologies but also be reflected in our approach to
environmental, social, and ethical responsibility. . .We are counting on you to continue this journey with us as
trusted but also, of course, constructively critical partners with a focus on the future (Hohmann-Dennhardt,
Zetsche, & Weber, 2012).
The main area in which US and European firms appear to converge in terms of their rationales for CSR engagement
is in the environmental area. The latter is also a core focus of CSR activity for firms in both regions and is the area for
which they disclose the most and highest quality information about their impacts and plans for improvement.
5. Discussion and conclusions
What do the results of the content analysis tell us about how different varieties of capitalism shape firms’
engagement with the norms and practices of the global CSR organisational field? Our findings provide partial support
for the argument that firms in the coordinated market economies of continental Europe tend to engage more
substantively with voluntary CSR norms and practices than firms in liberal market economies such as the US. These
findings correspond with the results reported by Van Tulder et al. (2009), who argue that firms in continental Europe
are more capable of addressing CSR concerns than their US counterparts because they are more culturally attuned to
taking stakeholders’ demands seriously. In particular this claim is corroborated by our analysis of the social sections of
the firms’ reports in which European firms disclose significantly more and higher quality information about their
labour and human rights commitments than their US counterparts. Indeed, outside of diversity and health and safety,
the quality of reporting by US firms on these issues is so poor that it seems fair to conclude that their engagement with
these issues is largely ceremonial in nature, as Lim and Tsutsui (2012) maintain (see also Kinderman, this issue).
Further, our results show that European firms’ more substantive commitment to social issues appears to be related to
the greater value firms in CMEs place on engaging with non-market stakeholders (See Tosun et al., this issue). It is worth
noting that European firms also appear to be influenced by market incentives and actors, but to a lesser extent than their US
counterparts and, crucially, not to exclusion of other societal actors. The CEO/management statements of the US firms
seem to confirm that they have little interest in interacting with overtly political stakeholders or the norms these actors
seek to promote. Rather, as is in keeping with firms in liberal market economies, the social practices of US TNCs seem to
be largely shaped by market actors. Although US firms appear to have maintained their longstanding attachment to the
communities in which they operate, these obligations do not seem to translate into commitments to specific societal
stakeholders or lending legitimacy to the social pressure these actors seek to exert. Unions, government regulators and
international organisations—the main promoters of social/labour standards—hardly feature in US firms’ reports.
If the results of firms’ social CSR practices largely support the contention that CSR management will be more
developed in CMEs than in LMEs, the results from the environmental sections pose serious challenges to the broader
claim that varieties of capitalism shape CSR engagement at all. Although European firms tend to provide more
elaborated reporting in their environmental sections than their US counterparts, the differences here are much less
pronounced. Perhaps even more importantly, firms from both types of capitalism engage more substantively with
environmental norms and management practices than with social norms and practices. This holds for European as well
as for US corporations. Indeed the quality of environmental reporting in the US is significantly higher than the social
reporting of the European firms.
These findings suggest that the global CSR organisational field has been far more effective in promoting
environmental than labour and human rights engagement. A variety of capitalism account cannot explain this finding.
First, it is difficult to understand why European firms are more responsive to their stakeholders’ environmental
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demands than social demands. CMEs are supposed to be structured to foster close relations between employees and
employers. Further, it is difficult to explain why US firms engage with environmental practices at such a high level
when they seem to place so little value on the actors that promote environmental sustainability. Finally, no variant of
the varieties of capitalism thesis can explain why firms from LMEs and CMEs appear to be converging around the
common norms and practices of environmental care embedded in the global organisational field.
Although our data do not allow us to give a definitive answer to this puzzle, they do provide strong hints about why
firms in both the US and Europe engage more substantively with environmental stewardship than labour or human
rights. First, there is evidence that the global CSR organisational field itself promotes environmental standards more
effectively than labour standards. Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) argue that the standards bodies that sponsor private
labour codes are often reluctant to adopt many of the core principles of the organisational field such as multi-
stakeholder governance and consensual decision-making that business actors find credible. Environmental
sustainability standards bodies, by contrast, have embraced these norms. In addition, many of the standards-
setting bodies have done a better job of creating specific environmental measures for firms to benchmark themselves
against. The GRI reporting standard, for example, has 34 environmental, 16 labour and 12 human rights indicators that
it recommends that firms report on (GRI, 2013).
Further, we suspect that environmental norms have simply become more embedded in global markets than the social
norms that underpin labour and human rights. This would explain why firms from both liberal and coordinated market
economies appear to engage more substantively with environmental management practices. US firms may not need
pressure from non-market stakeholders to react. They may simply be responding to what they perceive markets now
demand and/or are likely to demand in the future. Similarly, the greater levels of environmental engagement by European
firms might suggest that markets, in addition to their non-market stakeholders, reward such behaviour to a greater extent
than they reward firms’ improved social performance. This interpretation is supported by the fact that market motivation
is also relatively strong among European firms. As firms in both regions pay close attention to what markets and market
actors demand, it is a common source of influence that could explain their more convergent environmental engagement.
Our findings also imply that environmental norms have been constructed to fit better with market motivations than
the norms and practices that make up the social field. Several areas of environmental impact such as resource use,
product stewardship and energy use, for example, could easily be perceived to increase firms’ economic as well as
environmental performance. This perception is echoed in many of the reports published by both European and US
firms, which frequently refer to ‘eco-efficiencies’ generated by their environmental activities and the future
opportunities that lie in green product and service markets. The areas highlighted in the social fields of labour and
human rights such as wages, collective bargaining and monitoring of non-employee human rights are more likely to be
associated with costs—reputational and material—than gains.
Thus there are good reasons to believe that norms of corporate environmentalism, at least as currently conceived, fit
better with broader market structures than the norms that underpin the labour and human rights practice of the social field.
This is not to argue that environmentalism is inherently more compatible with market activity or the profit motive. Forty
years ago, markets did not reward firms for improvements in environmental performance. Today corporate managers
appear to perceive markets as doing just that. If markets now reward improved corporate environmental performance and
punish poor performers that is because the normative structures of markets have changed. The change may well be one of
managers’ perceptions, but these perceptions appear to have consequences and implications for the conditions under
which private authority CSR regimes are able to influence firm’s management practices.
These findings are based on a relatively small sample of firms from just four countries. Generalising from them
should be done with care. But we believe the findings and the approach we have taken highlight at least three
potentially important avenues of future research. First, our results highlight that future research within the private
governance literature should pay more attention to differences across CSR issue areas in addition to studying variation
across home country and CSR codes. Our results show that home country, and indeed different varieties of capitalism,
shape firms’ incentives to provide public goods, but these effects are contingent on issue area and in the case of
varieties of capitalism, perhaps more limited than is sometimes implied by the current debate.
Second, more research is needed on what societal issues firms are willing to take responsibility for in the absence of
binding mandates. We know far too little about what motivates firms to engage in CSR activities, a question that is both
logically prior to issues of CSR code effectiveness and necessary to understand it. This question becomes all the more
important if, as our findings indicate, private governance is found to be a more effective tool of corporate
environmental than social engagement. A growing number of studies (Bartley, 2010; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009) hint
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at this conclusion. The evidence utilised in this study can only provide hints at why firms engage more substantively
with environmental CSR. More systematic research focused on this question is needed to firmly establish this finding
and, if substantiated, to explain why it should be the case.
Finally, not enough of the current research on private governance examines the extent to which firms’ engagement
with CSR is influenced by their activities in host countries. A firm’s home country is likely to remain an important
determinant of its behaviour given all the reasons discussed in this paper and the literature. But the extent of its
international activities and the socio-political environment of the host countries in which it operates—something we
hold roughly constant across our two samples—likely also shapes CSR engagement. Significant activity in host
countries, for example, influences the calculus of risk that firms face and may also increase managers’ exposure to the
norms and best practices contained in the global CSR organisational field. More work in the future should examine
these host country effects and analyse the ways in which they interact with the influence of firms’ home countries.
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Appendix A
List of European MNCs included in the study
Company name Headquarters Industry sector Primary sales locationa
Allianz Germany Finance & Insurance EUR
BASF Germany Manufacturing EUR
BMW Germany Manufacturing HOST
Daimler Germany Manufacturing HOST
Deutsche Bank Germany Finance & Insurance EUR
Deutsche Post Germany Utilities EUR
Deutsche Telkom Germany Utilities EUR
E.ON Germany Utilities EUR
EADS Netherlands Manufacturing HOST
Glencore International Switzerland Manufacturing EUR
ING Bank Netherlands Finance & Insurance EUR
Metro Germany Retail Trade EUR
Munich Re Group Germany Finance & Insurance EUR
Nestle Switzerland Manufacturing HOST
Robert Bosh Germany Manufacturing N/S
Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands Manufacturing HOST
RWE Germany Utilities EUR
Siemens Germany Manufacturing HOST
Volkswagen Germany Manufacturing EUR
Zurich Insurance Group Switzerland Finance & Insurance HOST
a Preponderance of sales generated in home region or host regions. EUR: Europe; Host: Host Regions; N/S: not supplied.
List of US MNCs included in the study
Company name Headquarters Industry sector Primary sales locationa
Archer Daniels Midland USA Manufacturing HOST
AT&T USA Utilities USA
Bank of America USA Finance and Insurance USA
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